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1. כִּי תִקְצֹר קְצִירְךָ בְשָׂדֶךָ וְשָׁכַחְתָּ עֹמֶר בַּשָּׂדֶה, לֹא תָשׁוּב לְקַחְתּוֹ–לַגֵּר לַיָּתוֹם וְלָאַלְמָנָה, יִהְיֶה: לְמַעַן יְבָרֶכְךָ יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ, בְּכֹל מַעֲשֵׂה
   יָדֶיךָ. (דברים, כד:יט
2. למען יברכך- ואף על פי שבאת לידו שלא במתכוין קל וחמר לעושה מצוה במתכוין אמור מעתה נפלה סלע מידו ומצאה עני ונתפרנס בה הרי הוא מתברך עליה (רש”י, שם
3. יש אומרים שאין מצות צריכות כוונה ויש אומרים שצריכות כוונה לצאת בעשיית אותה מצוה וכן הלכה (שלחן ערוך, אורח חיים, סימן ס, סעיף ב
4. אין הקדוש ברוך הוא מקפח שכר כל בריה (מכילתא, שמות כב:ל

The Gemara (Rosh Hashana 28b) records a disagreement which is known as mitzvot tzrichot kavvana (or not). The Gemara discusses two cases of mitzvot done without intention; (a) a person forced to eat matza and (b) a person who blows shofar for musical purposes. The dispute is not clearly resolved in the Gemara, but the Shulchan Aruch says that in order to fulfill one’s obligation one must perform the mitzvah with intention to do the mitzvah.

What is meant by “intention?” The Mishna Brurah (siman 60, # 10) writes “…initially one must certainly be careful to intend before each mitzvah to fulfill the obligation of the mitzvah…”

The Mishna Brurah reflects the Gemara. The Gemara’s examples of lack of intent are people performing the mitzvah against their will or for a purpose other than that of discharging his religious duty.

A Jew must be conscious of his obligations and whether he has met them. The Shulchan Aruch rules that meeting obligations requires that the actions be accompanied by kavvana-intention. If a person performs the act of the mitzvah without kavvana, he has not fulfilled his duty and he must repeat the act with kavvana.

Is kavvana required equally by all mitzvot? From the Gemara and Shulchan Aruch it would seem that it is. However the Chovot Halevavot (Chovot Halevavot is one of the oldest books on ethics that we possess. It was written in Spain in the eleventh century by Rabbeinu Bachya ben Pakkuda.) makes an interesting distinction between categories of mitzvot. He writes (Page 341 in the edition of Rav Yosef Kaffach.) that when a king issues an order the king’s order is carried out with all possible dedication. This being true for kings, it is certainly true for the performance of God’s orders. So, one could ask, how is it possible that one of the most notable of the Rabbis of the Gemara could hold that mitzvot do not require kavvana?

Rabbeinu Bachya explains that mitzvot can be divided into three categories. There are mitzvot which are only duties of the levavot (which can be translated as the heart, or the intellect). These mitzvot include the mitzvot of belief and trust in God. A second category is composed of mitzvot that involve both the levavot and the eivarim ( which means the limbs of the body). Mitzvot of this type are prayer and the study of Torah. These two types of mitzvot demand total dedication in their execution. And total dedication means a complete, single-minded devotion to fulfilling God’s requirement.

On the other hand, there is a third category of mitzvah. This is the group of mitzvot which are purely of the eivarim .The mitzvot of tzitzit and sukka are members of this group. Rabbeinu Bachya says that kavvana is not essential to these mitzvot, because the mind has no role in their performance. These are the mitzvot about which it said mitzvot ein tzrichot kavvana.

There is an important point that we can learn from Rabbeinu Bachya. For the great ethicist Rabbeinu Bachya kavvana is not merely intent. Kavvana carries with it a sense of urgency and zeal. Mitzvot must be performed with (at least) the same zeal that we would perform a mission for a king.

This discussion is rather legalistic. It is a yes/no sort of issue- did it count or didn’t it count? But beyond this question of “did it count” there is another issue of “will the act be rewarded at all?”

The answer to this question is, yes. Acts that yield a positive outcome are rewarded. (in this essay I will use the word “mitzvah” to describe acts that fulfill a specific obligation of the Torah, and the phrase “good deed” to describe any act that yields a positive outcome).

Rashi (quoting the Sifrei) says that even a dropped coin earns a reward if the coin helped a poor person. From Shulchan Aruch (if not Rabbeinu Bachya) it seems that the person who dropped the coin did not perform a mitzvah (because there was no intention to give charity) but nevertheless Hashem gives the person who dropped the coin a reward. Rashi teaches us that there is a reward for good deeds even when no mitzvah was performed.

What distinguishes the reward for a mitzvah from the reward for a good deed? A person could say that while there is a reward for good deeds, there is more reward for a mitzvah- it’s all a matter of how much.

While this may be true I think there is a different answer , and it is one that won’t come as much of a surprise. The Rambam writes:

העובד מאהבה, עוסק בתורה ובמצוות והולך בנתיבות החכמה–לא מפני דבר בעולם, לא מפני יראת הרעה, ולא כדי לירש הטובה: אלא עושה האמת, מפני שהוא אמת; וסוף הטובה לבוא בכלל. (הלכות תשובה, פרק י)

The worthy person does not serve Hashem in order to gain a reward, he serves because it is the right thing to do. Reward really is not a sign of Divine favor. Even dogs get a reward.

(וְאַנְשֵׁי-קֹדֶשׁ, תִּהְיוּן לִי; וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ, לַכֶּלֶב תַּשְׁלִכוּן אֹתוֹ (שמות כב:ל.

The dogs were silent during the plague of the first-born (Shemot 11:7) and as a reward dogs are given carcasses. Obviously dogs don’t do mitzvot. Mitzvot, first-and-foremost are the products of a free-will choice. However, Hashem rewards all positive actions, including those done accidentally by humans and those done by animals.

But these positive acts are far removed from mitzvot. When a person does a mitzva he has improved himself spiritually by properly exercising his free-will. Consequently, this person has earned a better-place in the World-to-Come which is the place where the person’s spirit can flourish.

הטובה הצפונה לצדיקים, היא חיי העולם הבא; והם החיים שאין עימהן מוות, והטובה שאין עימה רעה. הוא שכתוב בתורה, “למען ייטב לך, והארכת ימים” מפי השמועה למדו “למען ייטב לך” לעולם שכולו טוב, “והארכת ימים” לעולם שכולו ארוך; וזה הוא העולם הבא שכר הצדיקים–הוא שיזכו לנועם זה, ויהיו בטובה זו….. (רמב”ם הלכות תשובה פרק ח)

The person who drops a coin has not grown. Dropping a coin is not a mitzvah and the act of dropping a coin will not earn a place in the World to Come. However the outcome of dropping a coin may be happy for some needy family, and Hahsem will bless the person who dropped the coin. What is the purpose of the reward given to the dogs and the absent-minded coin-droppers? The Sifrei answers:

אמר רבי אלעזר בן עזריה: מנין למאבד סלע מתוך ידו ומצאה עני ונפרנס בה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאלו זכה? ת”ל, “לגר ליתום ולאלמנה יהיה למען יברכך ה’ א-להיך.” והרי דברים קל וחומר! מי שלא נתכוין לזכות וזכה מעלה עליו הכתוב כאלו זכה, מי שנתכוין לזכות וזכה, על אחת כמה וכמה.

The blessings given for unintentional good deeds are meant to inspire us to aim to fulfill the mitzvot. The Sifrei emphasizes that these unintended acts carry no merit; the person who dropped the coin is treated as if he merited (כאלו זכה).

The Shulchan Aruch rules that mitzvot must be preceded by kavvana. The Mishna Brurah quotes the Chayei Adam that the issue of kavvana is only relevant where the act of performing the mitzvah is ambiguous. In other words, when a person watching this action does not realize that this action is a “mitzvah” then for this action to be counted as a mitzvah the person must specifically intend for this act to be considered a mitzvah.

This leads to an interesting disagreement.

The Torah commands us to pay the people who work for us, on the day that the work is performed:

בְּיוֹמוֹ תִתֵּן שְׂכָרוֹ וְלֹא-תָבוֹא עָלָיו הַשֶּׁמֶשׁ, כִּי עָנִי הוּא, וְאֵלָיו, הוּא נֹשֵׂא אֶת-נַפְשׁוֹ; וְלֹא-יִקְרָא עָלֶיךָ אֶל-יְהוָה, וְהָיָה בְךָ חֵטְא. (דברים כד:טו) מצות עשה ליתן שכר השכיר בזמנו, שנאמר “ביומו תיתן שכרו”… (רבמ”ם הל’ שכירות י”ב:א)

Paying wages is a mitzva. But it’s an act performed countless times every day by all sorts of people. For the observant Jew this unpleasant bill-paying is actually a joyous reward-filled opportunity to perform the mitzvah of b’yomo titein s’charo.

But non-Jews pay their bills as well, either because it is the ethical thing to do, or because they don’t want to be sued. Presumably there are also some Jews who pay their bills for those reasons as well, due to their not knowing that bill-paying is a mitzvah. So the mitzvah of b’yomo titein s’charo would meet the criterion of the Chayei Adam of an ambiguous act, and for the act of paying a bill to be credited as a mitzvah the debt must be paid with intent to fulfill the mitzvah.

Rav Ben-Zion Abba Sha’ul zt”l elaborates on this in his Or l’Zion (45:4). He quotes the Kaf HaChayim (siman 251, #19) that a person can fulfill fourteen mitzvot with a single haircut! But Rav Abba Sha’ul emphasizes that bill-paying requires kavvana prior to handing over the cash.

A different view is found in the responsa of Rav Shlomo Kluger (1783-1869) is one of the pre-eminent poskim of the past 300 years. zt”l in the collection Sh’eilot u’Tshuvot Etz HaChayim (siman 54, U’v’hachi). In reasoning that seems (to me at least) reminiscent of the Chovot Halevavot , Rav Shlomo Kluger distinguishes between mitzvot bein adam l’Makom and mitzvot bein adam l’chaveiro..

The mitzvot in the first category, are those that involve the person and Hashem. One could describe these mitzvot as classically “religious acts.” These acts when performed out of habit lack meaning. They possess only religious meaning and they acquire their significance when the person performing them has the minimal religious intention of performing this ritual for Hashem. Without kavvanah they do not deserve any consideration.

The mitzvot of the second category are the mitzvot where one person helps another. I think that Rav Shlomo Kluger holds that since the deed (in his example it is the guarding of a lost object) has inherent value, it also has value as a mitzvah even without special kavvana. (There remains a question. If Rav Shlomo Kluger does not require kavannah by mitzvot bein adam l’chaveiro, then why is the person who dropped a coin not credited with a mitzvah when the coin is found by a poor man? It may be that while Rav Shlomo Kluger does not require specific kavvanah to perform a mitzvah, he does require as a minimum the conscious decision to perform a particular action. The accidental dropping of the coin lacks any component of will at all.)

Much can be said about the views of Rav Abba Sha’ul and Rav Shlomo Kluger. The question if an act done without religious feeling has religious merit is alluded to by the Rambam (See the notes in Frankel edition of the Rambam with regard to the textual variations of this Rambam.) in Hilchot Melachim 8:11 . However it is encouraging to know as we start a new year that when we go to get our hair cut there is the opportunity to perform fourteen mitzvot if we just think about it.