Archive for the ‘Aggada’ Category


R. Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: “Even if a Jew is the hired hand of a resident gentile (and the Jew does not live in the courtyard) he can contribute towards the eruv and this suffices.” R. Nachman said: “How great is this teaching.” R. Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: “Someone who drinks a revi’it of wine cannot give halachic rulings.” R. Nachman said: This is not a great teaching since my mind thinks clearly only after drinking a revi’it of wine.” Rav said to him: “Why did the master speak this way? Did not R. Acha bar Chanina say: “’He that keeps company with prostitutes loses his wealth’ (Mishlei 29:3). Whoever says this teaching is pleasant and that one is not loses the wealth of Torah.” He said to him: “I retract my statement.” (Eruvin 64a)

R. Acha’s play on words gets lost in translation. He breaks up the Hebrew word “zonot” into the two words, “zo na’eh.” Thus, a verse about the destructiveness of prostitution suddenly refers to ranking rabbinic statements. How opposed to ranking are we?

Maharsha extends the scope of the opposition, contending that it applies to both negative and positive evaluations of rabbinic teachings. He argues that praising one statement often implies criticism of another. Therefore, we study without comparatively evaluating the worth of different rabbinic ideas. His position coheres with the play on words that objects to saying “zo na’eh.”

Yet taking this to an extreme appears difficult. Can students of Torah not express their love for certain works, particular passages, or specific ideas? Taking that option away removes an important vehicle for conveying attachment to Torah. Furthermore, can a scholar never articulate disagreement with some vehemence? Certainly, most arguments should simply focus on the issues involved but the occasional negative exclamation seems reasonable.

R. Shmuel Strashun notes that Chazal themselves engaged in such evaluations. For example, Rami bar Chama (Shavuot 45b) praises a particular teaching and no one objects to his formulation. Rashash concludes that, contra Maharsha, the problem exists only with regard to negative evaluations. This theory indicates a preference for positive discourse and opens up the possibility of talking about those parts of Torah we feel most strongly about.

Talmudic evidence motivates a further qualification. When Ulla says (Ta’anit 3b) that one of R. Chisda’s explanations is like “smoke to the eyes and vinegar to the teeth,” no one indicates displeasure with Ulla’s remark. Apparently, even negative evaluations have their place. Rashash suggests that a scholar can talk this way but only in the context of a rabbinic argument. Perhaps we can explain his point as follow. Critical language can be a natural part of argumentation; outside that context, it reflects a lack of respect or an excessive desire to criticize.

R. Yoshiyahu Pinto comes to an opposing conclusion. He argues that R. Nachman does not retract his opposing position, he only regrets his language. Scholars have every right to contest each other’s positions but they must do so respectfully. R. Pinto calls for a discourse of argument that focuses exclusively on the issues.

Varying positions indicate the delicate balance of these issues. On the one hand, we need to show respect to the totality of Torah. On the other hand, expressing our love for particular parts of Torah, and perhaps even our difficulty with other aspects, should also have a place.

[I have enjoyed writing both aggada blogs and medieval Jewish philosophy blogs this past year and I thank WebYeshiva for the forum and readers for stimulating comments. Next week, I will shift to the new academic year’s topics and focus on Avot and Ramban’s commentary on the Torah.]

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Last Updated on Thursday, 27 August 2009 11:54

Rav said: “Whoever says shalom to another before praying is like someone who builds a private altar as it says: ‘Cease you from man whose breath is in his nostrils, for what is he to be accounted’ (Yeshayahu 2: 22). Do not read it as bameh (for what) but as bamah (a private altar).” Shmuel said: “For what do you grant significance to this fellow and not to God.” R. Sheshet asked a question: “In between the chapters of shema, a person can ask out of respect and respond (apparently, one can inquire of another’s welfare before praying the amida)?” R. Abba explained: “The prohibition only applies when one goes early to another’s door.”

The paragraph above includes both halachic and aggadic elements; our analysis relates to both. Meiri argues that greeting another person before communicating with God conveys that you grant divinity to the other fellow. Even if we do not accept his strong formulation, we can understand that the problem stems from giving another person precedence before God. Shmuel’s statement confirms this analysis.

If this explains the problem, beginning the day with any prayer to God, even if not the amida, may remove the prohibition because that sequence still gives God precedence. On the other hand, the Talmud’s example of someone in the middle of shema suggest that the prohibition remains in place after one has already progressed in the prayer service but has still not arrived at the amida. Meiri posits that, after a prayer but before the amida, the prohibition continues on a much less severe level (see also Magen Avraham Orach Chaim 89:7).

Let us move to the aggadic plane. Shmuel reads the verse at face value as implying humanity’s lesser status. Using a play on words, Rav introduces the comparison to a private altar. Why add this comparison? In Ein Aya, R. Kook offers an important explanation. R. Kook points out that the pursuit of peace comes from one of two sources – a shared vision of divinity with a concomitant recognition of godly ideals or a social contract made up by individuals who recognize that shared ventures enable the participants to more successfully achieve their desires. When tried by the test of time, only the former model proves enduring. Since individuals only join the second kind of group to realize their own desires, a conflict of interest will inevitably cause the dissolution of the group. Former partners turn into bitter enemies.

Take note that R. Kook interprets the giving of shalom in our gemara as not just a polite good morning but as representing the value of peace. Praying before giving shalom emphasizes that the ideal quest for peace is rooted in religious ideals and not just in the recognition that “man is a political animal.” The message of the gemara moves from the need to give precedence to God to a framework for achieving universal harmony.

R. Kook does not address another possibility. In drawing a contrast between a unity based on religious ideals and a unity based on shared pursuit of comfort, he does not discuss a peace emerging out of secular ethical ideals. Applying other statements of R. Kook to this context leads to a complex and nuanced position. On the one hand, he criticizes an ethic divorced from a notion of God. On the other hand, he views any quest for morality and justice as truly rooted in divinity, even if its practitioners are not aware of this. Thus, R. Kook may view a humanitarian search for harmony as falling on the correct side of this divide.

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Last Updated on Sunday, 23 August 2009 12:05

R. Chisda said: “Anyone who disagrees with his rebbe is like someone who disagrees with the divine presence as it says: ‘when they strove against the Lord’ (Bamidbar 26:9).” (Sanhedrin 109a)

Korach’s rebellious band directed its attack of Moshe and Aharon; yet the biblical verse depicts them as striving against God. R. Chisda derives that starting up with your teacher equals quarreling with God. Looking at R. Chisda’s statement in isolation, we might conclude that Judaism demands absolute submission to teachers. Perhaps the student’s role is only to take notes and memorize or even to ask questions but never to challenge.

Throughout the last fifteen hundred years of commentary, rabbinic authorities rejected such an interpretation. Many of them point out that this understanding flies in the face of our tradition. R. Yehuda haNassi argues with his father and teacher R. Shimon ben Gamliel. Rava contests the positions of his master Rabba. The same pattern continues throughout the period of the rishonim (see Terumat haDeshen pesakim 238 and Be’er Sheva on Sanhedrin for examples).

If so, what does R. Chisda teach? Rambam explains (Hilchot Talmud Torah 5:2) that a student should not set up a yeshiva without his teacher’s permission. Apparently, respect calls for receiving the teacher’s approval before a student embarks on a public teaching career. It does not call for stifling arguments against that teacher’s halachic positions. The quest for halakhic truth demands the airing of all reasonable claims and positions.

What place does respecting a rebbe have within this quest? A fascinating responsum of R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggrot Moshe Yoreh Deah 3:88) helps elucidate this issue. A scholar asked R.Moshe if he could move to Bnei Brak even though he would occasionally rule against the positions of the Chazon Ish. R. Moshe could not see any cause for concern. He writes that it never occurred to the Chazon Ish that future scholars would feel barred from arguing with him. Furthermore, any scholar who carefully investigate the words of an earlier authority shows respect for that authority, even when the later scholar ultimately rejects the position.

R. Moshe mentions two expression of respect. One should not speak of the earlier scholar in a derogatory fashion. A writer can disagree with an earlier position with a tone of dismissive arrogance or with genuine reverence. The great figures of our tradition certainly merit the latter treatment.

The second expression of respect emerges from Rava’s advice to his students regarding how to proceed after his death (Bava Batra 130b). Rava instructs them not to blindly follow his rulings if they have decent arguments for an alternative position. At the same time, he tells them not to tear up his rulings. Perhaps he would have successfully answered their objections had he been alive. Perhaps the students themselves will eventually realize the cogency of their teacher’s position.

The words of towering figures deserve our utmost esteem. This means avoiding any easy rejections of their ideas and thinking seriously about how to justify their positions. Yet it does not mean an inability to disagree. When disagreements come from a place of knowledge and respect, they are fully appropriate and even mandatory.

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Last Updated on Tuesday, 18 August 2009 10:59

R. Yehuda taught: “In the future, the Holy One, blessed be He, will bring the yetzer hara and slaughter it before the righteous and the wicked. To the righteous, it appears as a tall mountain. To the wicked, it appears as a hairsbreadth. Each group cries. The righteous cry and say: ‘How were we able to conquer this tall mountain?’ The wicked cry and say: ‘How were we unable to conquer this hairsbreadth?’ And God also wonders with them as it says: ‘Thus says the Lord of hosts: If it be wondrous in the eyes of the remnant of this people in those days, it is also wondrous in my eyes.’” (Sukka 52a)

R. Yehuda’s teaching reverses normal assumptions. We imagine that the wicked exaggerate the power of the evil inclination whereas the righteous restore it to its proper dimension, yet R. Yehuda offers us the opposite perspective. Why do the righteous look back upon something imposing while the wicked see a force they should have easily overcome?

Do the righteous truly encounter a more fearsome inclination or is it just a matter of perspective? Some commentators explain our gemara based on a maxim found on the same Talmudic page: “Whoever is greater than his colleague has a more powerful yetzer.” Taking that maxim literally leads to the conclusion that the righteous really do face stronger temptation. Of course, we need to analyze why this should be so.

Sefat Emet raises an interesting explanation for why the righteous struggle with more potent forces. Worthy individuals succeed in overcoming small temptations and ultimately face larger ones. On the other hand, those that give in immediately to minor challenges never struggle with a harder battle. They concede the fight long before confronting the most trying aspects. A high school student who cheats on every trivial math quiz will not have to think much before cheating on an exam crucial for getting into college.

Conversely, the distinction may all depend upon perspective. R. Avraham Grodzinski, mashgiach at the Slobodka yeshiva, mentions, in the context of explaining this gemara, the inflationary ability of the imagination (Torat Avraham, p. 308). Indeed, we often imagine forbidden pleasures as experiences of paradise when the truth remains far more prosaic. Perhaps this explains the discrepancy. The wicked experience these pleasures and discover the sobering truth that imagination portrays them as greater than reality. The righteous resist these pleasures while still imagining that doing so means giving up magnificent delights.

However, we cannot take this point too far and claim that wise and discerning individuals should effortlessly understand that forbidden pleasures are not worth it. Real challenges exist and they are not always easily overcome. The part of this gemara that describes the two groups crying helps provide the proper balance.

We can understand why the wicked cry but why should the righteous shed tears when reflecting upon their great accomplishments? Rashi explains that they cry when remembering the difficult struggles with the yetzer hara. Maharsha disagrees, claiming that the righteous cry tears of joy. R. Yaakov Ettlinger, Arukh laNer, offers an alternative that relates to our previous discussion. He explains that the righteous cry in an attempt to secure some mercy for the wicked. Their depiction of the difficulties of the inclination serves an argument for some clemency for those who failed the test.

We now have the desired balance. On the one hand, we understand how forbidden fruit looks more alluring that it truly is. At the same time, we do not naively tell people that internalizing that message leads quickly and easily to righteousness. This world includes truly difficult challenges. May we meet them successfully.

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Last Updated on Monday, 10 August 2009 12:26

Animal suffering is sanctioned when it serves a legitimate human need

Last week we examined the various Torah verses mandating humane treatment of animals; we saw that beyond the underlying prohibition of cruel treatment towards any animal, there is an additional obligation to act positively to relieve the suffering of animals that work with us and serve us – for example, to give our animals rest on Shabbat, to relieve the load of an overloaded pack animal, and so on.

There is still a bit of a paradox. We are not allowed to cause suffering gratuitously to any animal, but if there is a valid human need then even if the animal will suffer the treatment is not considered cruelty. For this reason, there is no question that it is permissible and proper to use animals in medical experiments that are expected to lead to treatments that will alleviate human suffering. But this very usefulness is also what cements our obligation to show concern for the animals.

So the prohibition on animal suffering would never forbid using animals for an important human need, even if the use involved animal suffering; but it would forbid causing suffering not necessary for that need. Nachmanides writes, “[God's] mercy on creatures with an animal soul does not extend to prevent us from using them for our needs.” (Ramban Torah commentary Devarim 22:6)

This standard seems to be stricter than the standard for bal taschchit, which forbids gratuitous harm to or destruction of anything valuable or useful to humans. Regarding bal tashchit only gratuitous harm is forbidden, but tzaar baalei chaim, the prohibition on animal suffering, would seem to forbid also disproportionate suffering. In one place in the Talmud the sage Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair states that hamstringing an animal would constitute forbidden suffering, but only killing it would constitute gratuitous harm. My interpretation is that hamstringing the animal does bring some benefit, but not enough to justify the suffering induced. (Babylonian Talmud Chullin 7b; see explanation in Piskei Trumat Hadeshen 105)

An additional reason mentioned by the rabbis for human treatment of animals is that it cultivates humane conduct towards people, while inhumane treatment of animals carries the danger of inculcating insensitivity towards other people. (Some recent research confirms a connection between people who torture animals as youngsters and those who are violent as adults, though there is no way to tell if there is a causal relationship.)

The Sefer Hachinuch (596) writes: “Among the motivations for this commandment is to accustom ourselves to delicate souls, choosing the straight path and adhering to it, and seeking mercy and kindness. And once we obtain this habit, then even towards animals, which were created to serve us, we will show concern.”

And Nachmanides writes: “The reason for refraining [from taking the eggs in the presence of the mother] is to teach us the quality of mercy, and not to act cruelty. For cruelty [towards animals afterwards] spreads in the soul of man [and expresses itself towards people as well]“. (Ramban Torah commentary Devarim 22:6)

Each consideration is an independent aspect of the law. For example, the noted Medieval authority Rabbi Yisrael Isserlin ruled that plucking geese while they are alive, when there is a need for the feathers, is permissible; the geese do suffer, but there is an evident benefit. However, he then writes that people customarily refrain, because plucking the birds in this way leads to bad traits. (Piskei Trumat Hadeshen 105) Rabbi Moshe Isserlish writes approvingly of this custom. (Rema Shulchan Arukh Even Haezer 5:14)

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Last Updated on Thursday, 30 July 2009 08:33